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SWIMMING THE NEW STREAM: THE
DISJUNCTIONS BETWEEN AND WITHIN
POPULAR AND ACADEMIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
In the postwar era, legal scholars moved to a pragmatist approach
in international legal thought.' Pragmatism refers to "a modem
consequential philosophy that emphasized institutional process,
functional progress, or rule-centered doctrinal specificity, while
denying the relevance of coherent abstraction."2  This approach
attempted to cultivate a just world order based on the rule of law,
forcing nations to adhere to legal principles at the expense of raw
aggression.' Its goal was to use doctrinal analysis as the ultimate
technique in analyzing issues of institutional process and order in the
international arena.' Unfortunately, pragmatism never set forth a
central theory of social behavior, but simply hovered between the
older naturalist and positivist' schools of thought. Pragmatism
focused only on descriptions of varying institutional forms and
practices at the expense of theorizing about the nature of law and
social behavior.6 Without reference to a core theory to explain the
nature of social interaction in the international context, the pragmatist
approach foundered on doctrinal shores. Thus the resultant research
that it yielded produced a fragmented body of highly specific lists and
observations about international law lacking a cohesive evaluation of
1. Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 81
(1991).
2. Id. at 83.
3. Id. at 84.
4. Id.
5. By "positivist" I refer to the idea that government, as opposed to nature, is the source
of law. Id. at 82.
6. Id. at 87.
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the international legal order. The lesson, then, was that there can be
no substantive body of doctrine without an equally substantive
theoretical foundation. Due to its elevation of doctrine over theory
pragmatism failed as an effective paradigm.
Pragmatism did, however, open the door for later scholarship by
delving into the economic, and thus interdisciplinary, nature of
international law. Based on the pragmatist suggestion that concepts
of law are not located in a vacuum, but are explainable from more
than one philosophical perspective, public international law gradually
evolved from an apparatus for settling transnational jurisdictional
conflicts,7 to a broader field emphasizing "greater importance to the
economic activities of private entities and of parastatal enterprises." 8
Despite the failure of the pragmatists' doctrinal approach, their
awareness of the growing interpenetration of world economies laid the
basis for later and more important theoretical developments.
Today, pragmatism has been replaced by a "new stream" of
public, economic, and interdisciplinary international legal scholarship.
The new stream includes a wide variety of fields and methodologies
that can be divided between value-neutral (objective) and value-
central (subjective) paradigms. Objective scholars of public choice
theory, game theory, and, most importantly, law and economics
assume that social behavior is determined by "rational choice" and
should therefore be construed, predicted, and governed by this
premise. Conversely, theorists in critical legal studies, feminism, and
law and society (including cultural anthropology), posit the idea that
legal thought cannot escape the boundary of human subjectivity
because all models of social behavior will, in many ways, determine
what behaviors we see, notice, and emphasize. Despite these
differences, it is important to note that all these theories represent a
massive shift away from doctrinal analysis and towards core social
theory.9
New stream scholars attempt to transform the older, dichotomous
debates of naturalism versus positivism, and the "national" as opposed
to the "international," into a dialogue about the core nature of social
behavior and the appropriate formulations of international institutions
and practices that flow from this nature. These scholars use specific
7. Joel R. Paul, The New Movements in International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 607, 609-10 (1995).
8. Id. at 613.
9. Id
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theoretical bases to create an interdisciplinary awareness of vital issues
such as the massive global redistributions and flexible accumulations
of capital (i.e., the conditions of globalization), the systematic
exclusion of women from the international legal process, and the
cultural models which illuminate the exercise of political and military
power.'0
It is also necessary to note that one cannot understand the shape
of international law and diplomacy without an awareness of the
rhetoric of a key international concept: the "new world order". I
contend that the best way to analyze the influential implications of the
new world order doctrine is to examine the definitions, justifications,
and applications of this doctrine in the news media. In doing so, we
come to comprehend the corpus of international legal thought as it
appears in actual political discussion directed at the vast majority of
citizens in the most powerful nation on earth. To that end, I locate
the doctrine of the new world order in a rhetorical arena which I call
"popular international law," meaning the rhetorical dimension of
public and economic international law as reflected by the statements
of powerful politicians and influential journalists. This rhetoric shapes
the American understanding of and support for international legal
doctrine. Subjective new stream theorists, such as cultural anthropolo-
gists, are increasingly focusing on everyday life as an important locus
of study." In this vein, I examine the logical consistency of the new
world order doctrinal philosophy within the quintessential realm of
popular international law: the news media. A critical examination of
the new world order doctrine within the news media reveals an
outdated and contradictory hodgepodge of concepts, coroliaries, and
ideas that mirrors the discarded academic approach of pragmatism.
Likewise, the new world order doctrine suffers from the same malaise
as did the pragmatist approach, namely, an intense interest in doctrine
with little concern for a unified and cohesive theory of social behavior
that can effectively reformulate doctrine according to key theoretical
10. See generally David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy: John
Jackson and the Field of International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoLICY 671
(1995); Karen Engle, Views from the Margins: A Response to David Kennedy, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 105 (1994); Jennifer Schirmer, The Dilemma of Cultural Diversity and Equivalency in
Universal Human Rights Standards, in CULTURAL SURVIVAL: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTHRO-
POLOGY (Theodore E. Downing & Gilbert Kushner eds., 1988); Rosemary J. Coombe, The
Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to Law and Society in Conditions of
Globalization, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 792 (1995).
11. Coombe, supra note 10, at 810.
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premises.
I focus on the disjunctions between and within popular and
academic international law. In this article I utilize both the objective
and subjective paradigms of the new stream1 2 to demonstrate the
logical and moral superiority of theory-based (as opposed to doctrine-
based) international law concepts. I conclude that academic interna-
tional law can illuminate the logical inconsistencies within popular
international law. More importantly, this insight contains the morally
compelling idea that because American foreign policy often involves
the mobilization of massive amounts of resources and numbers of
lives, there is a responsibility to justify decisions and actions with a
clear, cohesive, and logically tenable core theory about the social
behavior of humanity.
This article is based on the premise that an important area of
study in the new stream of academic international law is discursive
power.13 In Part II, I argue that the theatre of the news media is a
worthy field of study for new stream scholars. A greater comprehen-
sion of the rhetoric of everyday life allows us to define the ideas and
ideological forces which shape the American public's conceptual
understandings and collective actions. In Part III, I counterpose
academic insights with statements on the new world order doctrine
taken from popular international law to demonstrate the problematic
nature of the new world order doctrine from both the objective and
subjective new stream perspectives, demonstrating the logical fallacies
embedded in the philosophy of the doctrine. The explanations of and
justifications for the new world order doctrine strongly suggest an
inherently contradictory and outdated corpus of thought in light of the
new stream of academic scholarship. Furthermore, an analysis of the
internal criticisms between various new stream perspectives illustrates
valuable multidisciplinary insights. Finally, in Part IV, I conclude that
despite the rhetorical and political obstacles of this analysis, there is
a morally compelling responsibility to use academic international law
to theoretically reformulate public and economic international law.
12. I tend to focus on an anthropological (law and society) approach in my critique. I also
utilize insights from the fields of feminism, public choice theory (international relations), and
international trade.
13. I am using the terms "discursive[ly]" and "discourse" here in terms of their analytical
value as rhetorical mechanisms. Rhetorical mechansisms in discourse reflect subjective perspec-
tives on social behavior and reveal political agendas and power relationships. SALLY E. MERRY,
GETrING JUSTICE AND GETrING EVEN 9 (1990). It is for this reason that we should engage in
discourse analysis of popular international law.
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With power comes the obligation to influence, intervene, and
negotiate from a coherent theoretical, philosophical, and doctrinal
agenda.
II. STUDYING THE NEWS MEDIA
A. Law and Society in Everyday Life
The rhetoric of popular international law is forged in the realm
of the news media. How power is exercised, justified, and actualized
is shaped by the news media's dialogue on international issues. The
philosophical rationale for the exercise of power, whether through
overt influence, intervention, or negotiation, is central to the public
understanding of and support for specific foreign policies. In sum, the
news media provides us with fertile ground for examining the rhetoric
of the American keystone in the bridge of public and economic
international law. Thus it is extremely important to analyze American
foreign policy's14 presence in popular international law. Anthropo-
logical considerations, stemming from the subjective side of the new
stream, also exemplify the importance of studying popular internation-
al law.
Anthropologists are interested in disjunctions: gaps and alterna-
tives within and between forms of discourse. Rosemary Coombe has
noted that law and society scholars such as cultural anthropologists are
increasingly focusing on law in everyday life in order to understand
discursive power. She argues that anthropological scholarship needs
to "regard the worlds of trade and investment, the worlds of migration
and production.., as proper fields for ethnographic inquiry."' I Thus
it becomes important to "do anthropology" of national and interna-
tional issues as economies become globalized."6 Such a project
necessitates a closer look at law in everyday life. 7
It is a short step from a focus on "everyday life" to an analysis of
the news media. In order to understand how political support is
cultivated for major legislation and policy decisions, statements by
powerful politicians and journalists need to be analyzed as they are
received by the vast majority of Americans. This kind of analysis is
14. I am speaking of American foreign policy broadly, not just in terms of public
international law, but also in terms of international economic law.
15. Coombe, supra note 10, at 810 (citing JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN COMAROFF,
ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE HiSTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992)).
16. Id
17. Id at 793.
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also in harmony with a more politically savvy anthropology, which
increasingly seeks to examine its ethical responsibilities and applica-
tions. This reexamination is a necessary step if anthropology, law and
society as a whole, as well as other subjective new stream disciplines
are to have an influential voice in shaping popular international law
in a more logically and morally tenable fashion. By shaping popular
international law new stream theorists can begin to influence
international legal doctrine. Coombe emphasizes this point in her
work. She views her attempt to shed light on the transnational status
of marginalized persons "as the ethical and political responsibility of
legal scholars in contemporary contexts .... .18
This argument draws heavily on Jennifer Schirmer's analysis of
cultural relativism and diversity. 9 Schirmer argues that anthropolo-
gists need to bring an understanding of culture into the absolute,
seemingly objective, world of western human rights considerations. °
Anthropology can be particularly powerful in its attempt to
contextualize "rights" and "wrongs."2" Schirmer explains the
powerful impact subjective new stream thought can have upon actual
economic and political decision making:
Here is where the calls for moral and legal constraints upon state
powers by both the human rights standard makers and by cultural
diversivists and contextualists are most crucial, for it is these
individuals who are in a position to recognize the immediate,
systematic abuse of the powerless by the powerful.'
Ultimately, an anthropological focus can provide an informed voice in
public international law as well as in international economic law.
Unfortunately, politicians embracing flawed political doctrines
currently have the strongest voices.
Anthropology is also extremely useful as a counterpart to
objective new stream thinking. Objective public choice theorists'
and international tradists'4 point to (and, in a very real sense, argue
in favor of) a homogenization of law through proper interface mecha-
18. Id. at 794.
19. Schirmer, supra note 10.
20. Id. at 93.
21. Id.
22. Id at 95.
23. See generally Mark W. Janis et. al., The Challenge of Universality, 83 AM. SOc'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 547 (1989).
24. See generally Kennedy, supra note 10.
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nisms and policy management.2' Conversely, subjective anthropolo-
gists offer counterpoints that explain how diverse legal understandings
emerge. These counterpoints are particularly relevant to the rhetoric
of popular international law because most marginal economic actors
today must navigate through a complex sea of legal rules and cultural
expectations which is routinely ignored by objective new stream
scholars. Generally speaking,
[tjraditionally, legal scholars of globalization addressed such issues
as ... the arbitration of international disputes, the spread of the
rule of law, and the transformation of legal practice - topics in
which a growing homogenization of law and the tendency toward a
greater similarity between legal regimes is often assumed. Anthro-
pologists, on the other hand, argue that the globalization of the
economy and the interdependence of societies has not led to
homogenization, but rather to a proliferation of new legalities andjuridical sensibilities at the intersections of legal cultures and legal
consciousness as new juridical norms are generated in their
interstices.... Anthropologists generally accept the proposition that
the significance(s) of capitalist developments are best comprehended
in terms of the cultural frames of reference within which they are
encountered and accomodated, countered or resisted. I shall,
therefore, proceed upon a premise that is self-evident to anthropolo-
gists but may be counter-intuitive to international legal scholars: the
premise that the "global" can only be understood locally and
culturally.26
Public international lawyers, politicians, and objective new stream
scholars such as economists hardly engage this premise. Subjective
new stream scholars such as cultural anthropologists must be the ones
to bring an analytical focus on power and discourse into the new
stream of academic international law and into the rhetoric of popular
international law. The actors who have the most powerful influences
over actual governmental policies are objectivist economists and public
international lawyers who are often either unaware or uninterested in
people marginalized by race, gender, and class; the disturbing
dislocations of globalization are not given enough thought. If
anthropology is to have any real value, it must use its insights to
change governmental doctrines and policies. This goal is a critical
step. Otherwise, the central premises of important subjective new
25. Id. at 703-08.
26. Coombe, supra note 10, at 796-97.
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stream lines of thought (i.e., class, gender, and race based hierarchies
of power related to the evils of terror, genocide, and ethnocide27) are
moot. If international trade and objectivist economics present one
manner of understanding globalization, then anthropology, an equally
valid subjective new stream discipline, presents a perspective that is at
least as valuable.
The goal, then, is to not just understand the "global" through the
lens of the "local", but to also understand the "local" though the legal
power of the "global". In this sense, new stream thinking becomes
less two branches of a river running on opposite sides of a sandbar
and more like two interspersed currents flowing through an unbroken
body of water. The objective side of the new stream is only objective
as long as we adhere to its basic premise: People always make rational
choices in the context of wealth maximization. But people do not
always make objectively rational choices, and other important
premises (e.g., peace, human rights, feminism, race relations, wealth
redistribution) obtain in social behavior besides economic ones. Once
we recognize this fact, it obviates the mutually exclusive nature of
objective and subjective new stream disciplines, bringing both bodies
of insightful theories under the umbrella of observational thought. In
this manner popular international law can be construed from a truly
holistic perspective.
B. The Theatre of the News Media: The Stage for Popular
International Law
Americans pay attention to and are influenced by the news
media.' For example, during the Persian Gulf war, a Times Mirror
News Interest Index demonstrated the central role of the media. Fifty
nine percent of survey respondents stated that they were paying close
attention to news reports.29 Strikingly, almost the same percentage
had given serious thought to military intervention in Kuwait,3
suggesting a correlation between media reports and public consider-
ation of events bearing on international legal thought as well as the
primacy of the media stage in formulating Americans' understandings
of international legal doctrine and policy.
27. See generally MICHAEL TAUSSIG, SHAMANISM, COLONIALISM, AND THE WILD MAN: A
STUDY IN TERROR AND HEALING (1987).
28. Divided Public Focused on Gulf News; Braced for Bloody War, Times Mirror News
Interest Index Shows, PR Newswire, January 10, 1991, available in WL, PR News Database.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Furthermore, the public tends to trust the news media. In the
same index, seventy eight percent of the respondents gave the media
a "good" or "excellent" rating, and sixty percent stated that the Gulf
story was being reported in a fair manner.31 Interestingly, despite the
broad impact of television reports in the information age, forty percent
stated that they were mostly informed by newspapers.32 These
empirical data exemplify the need to study the realm of the news
media as a primary locus of discursive power as it shapes and
cultivates popular international law.
III. POPULAR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ACADEMIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONFUSED STUDENT AND
THE INSIGHTFUL TEACHERS
An examination of key political statements can illuminate the
inherent problems in establishing the new world order doctrine as the
bedrock of popular international law. I focus on the Bush Administra-
tion's as well as journalists' statements made during the Persian Gulf
war and the Somali humanitarian mission. These events have
ramifications implicating a broad array of new stream insights,
including objective theories such as international trade and relations,
as well as subjective theories such as feminism and cultural anthropol-
ogy. These events also demonstrate a key flaw in popular internation-
al law: The shortcomings of doctrine without coherent theory.
A. The New World Order Doctrine in the Gulf: Basic Flaws,
Inconsistencies, and Disjunctions in the Stable Sovereigns
Approach
Throughout the Bush years, the president was highly focused on
foreign policy. Undeniably,
it was foreign policy that delighted, engaged and occupied Bush.
He joined forces with... James A. Baker III and Brent Scowcroft,
at the State Department and National Security Council, and they
plotted the U.S. response to the shocking collapse of communism,
the reunification of Germany, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the
opening for peace in the Middle East, the coup against then Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev and finally the dissolution of the
31. Id.
32. Id. This is a significant point because I will be focusing only on newspaper articles in
my analysis. A fuller treatment of television, radio, and magazine reports would be desirable,
but due to time and budgetary constraints such an analysis must be left to a future article.
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Soviet empire-a march of events that had been unthinkable when
Bush took office.33
Given the supremacy of the United States in the contemporary
international framework, Bush's assertions hold great sway over
popular international law.
The cornerstone of Bush's foreign policy was the new world order
doctrine. According to this doctrine, America would assume a central
leadership role in cultivating an intense respect for the sovereignty of
all existing nations which would in turn provide for a peaceful world:
Mr. Bush devoted much of his speech to a general, almost philo-
sophical, explanation to Americans of why he thinks U.S. armed
forces should be leading the fight to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait.
He returned again and again to the theme that success in the battle
will ensure a more tranquil world for decades to come. "We will
succeed in the Gulf" he said. "And when we do, the world
community will have sent an enduring warning to any dictator or
despot, present or future, who contemplates outlaw aggression."
Mr. Bush argued that the U.S. has a special responsibility to
accomplish such lofty goals because of America's powerful position
in the world. "This is the burden of leadership, and the strength
that has made America the beacon of freedom in a searching
world."3
Bush's rhetoric validates the sanctity of the new world order doctrine.
He "declared, 'we have before us the opportunity to forge, for
ourselves and for future generations, a new world order, a world
where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct
of nations.'
35
The doctrine seems to work as follows: There must be either
strategic (preferably) or humanitarian issues at the fore of a conflict
(preferably international) 36 in order for the United States to consider
involvement. Next, a careful weighing of the costs and benefits is
33. Ann Devroy, The Nation Changed, But Bush Did Not, WASH. PosT, January 17, 1993,
at A01.
34. Michel McQueen & Gerald F. Seib, Bush Vows Victory in the Gulf War: State of Union
Puts War in Moral Terms, Recasts SDI Plans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1991, at A3.
35. Gerald F. Seib, Bush Tells Nation Operation is Going According to Plan, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 17, 1991, at Al.
36. This distinction, of course, may exclude internal conflicts that have extremely worthwhile
strategic and humanitarian issues which nonetheless fail to insult the sovereignty-based new
world order.
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entered into, and when the "good" substantially outweighs the "bad,"
American intervention is appropriate. 7
The Bush administration sought to freeze the late 1980s world
geography in a permanent, crystallized matrix of international order:
Secretary of State James Baker has said repeatedly that-except for
the three small Baltic republics, whose incorporation into the Soviet
Union the U.S. specifically refused to recognize--"the United States
has recognized the boundaries of the Soviet Union since 1933."...
"Our policy is that we don't favor the breakup of the Soviet
Union," except for the independence of the Baltics, explains a
senior administration official. "We have one policy for the
U.S.S.R., for Canada, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia-all the countries
that are threatening to break up. And that is that we'd like to see
them stay together."... Many in Congress agree that backing
independence for every ethnic group that wants it would mean
chaos in country after country. "You really have to deal with
nation states as they exist," says Democratic congressman Steny
Hoyer, who chairs the U.S. commission that monitors the Helsinki
accords. "In a hard-headed way, we have little alternative to
sovereignty, because of the incredible difficulty of sorting out claims
once you get beyond sovereign nations. 38
Furthermore,
tumultuous change can be inconsistent with Mr. Bush's vision of the
"new world order." Mr. Bush wants an international system in
which existing nations honor each other's integrity and work
together to ensure that change takes place peacefully under
international law. That, in fact, was the principle behind the drive
to liberate Kuwait. Such an approach envisions working closely
with the leaders of existing nations-not undermining them or their
states.39
37. At this point the nonpartisan emphasis of this critique should become clear. President
Clinton, a Democrat, engages in the same type of logically flawed analysis:
We can't be everywhere. We can't do everything. But where our interests and our
values are at stake-and where we can make a difference-America must lead. We
must not be isolationist or the world's policeman, but we can be its best peacemaker.
By keeping our military strong, by using diplomacy where we can, and force where we
must, by working with others to share the risk and the cost of our efforts, America is
making a difference for people here and around the world.
State of the Union, "America Must Lead", N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1995, at A10.
38. Walter S. Mossberg, In "New World Order", U.S. Military Help Is Reserved Solely for
Sovereign Nations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1991, at A10.
39. Gerald F. Seib, U.S. Commitment to Status Quo in World May Not Be Good Foreign
Policy in 1990s, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1991, at A3A.
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Thus the cornerstone of the new world order is stability through
sovereignty. The justification for this premise is twofold: First, a
lasting world peace can only be achieved through an intense respect
for current national boundaries; and second, if the United States were
to give greater deference to displaced and subjugated groups claiming
status as a nation, it would then be impossible to evaluate, negotiate,
and attempt to resolve international (and therefore important)
disputes.
But, considering the failure of the pragmatist movement in
international law, this approach is probably doomed to failure because
of its focus on the "rule of law" at the expense of a theoretical
vision.' Certainly teaching and research based on a rule of law
approach has severely atrophied.4' Moreover, the most successful
cultivation of the rule of law has been in the economic, not the
political arena, as the Bush Administration would have it.42 And
unlike Bush's approach, the economics of international trade proceed
from a core theory that overall wealth and standards of living will be
advanced by free trade: "'the goal [is] to minimize the amount of
interference of governments in trade flows that cross national
borders."' 43  Ultimately, the difficulties presented by creating a
political realm satiated by the rule of law must speak to the greater
"imaginative challenges ... [and] new opportunities . .. ."' to
formulate a theoretically coherent body of doctrinal international
order.
Another problem obtains in the diplomatic convenience of only
recognizing sovereigns. To illustrate, in "the Democratic response,
Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell of Maine [stated] .
'Students massacred in China, priests murdered in Central America,
demonstrators gunned down in Lithuania-these acts of violence are
as wrong as Iraqi soldiers killing civilians . ... We cannot oppose
repression in one place and overlook it in another."'45 This is not to
40. I do not mean to suggest that these are mutually exclusive categories. The point is that
if theory is "A" and doctrine is "B", then if one has A, it is possible to have B, but if one only
focuses on B, without A, then B is logically untenable under this analysis.
41. Janis et. al., supra note 23, at 555.
42. Id. at 549.
43. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 679 (citing JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989)).
44. Janis et. al., supra note 23, at 555.
45. McQueen & Seib, supra note 34.
SWIMMING THE NEW STREAM
say that participation in the Gulf war was an unwise choice by the
Bush Administration, or to delve into a partisan critique,4 6 but rather
to point out that it is extremely unlikely that the United States has
sent an "enduring warning to any dictator" when there are many
dictators who regularly engage in "outlaw aggression" whose nations
nonetheless receive most favored nation trade status regardless of such
conduct. One need look no further than America's healthy trade
relationship with China, which invaded and is currently occupying the
nation of Tibet.47 Given these realities, America's actions in the Gulf
alone would not seem to live up to a "special responsibility" to
achieve the "lofty goal" of ensuring the integrity of every nation's
sovereignty.4
To his credit, Bush recognized these obvious shortcomings
towards the end of his administration:
Sometimes the United States will intervene, President Bush offered
in a foreign policy farewell at West Point yesterday, and sometimes
it won't. But when? When the stakes warrant, when the benefits
outweigh the costs, when there's a plan to get in and a plan to get
out. On these criteria, Mr. Bush put American troops into Iraq and
Somalia and in a decision "just as difficult as a decision to send our
soldiers into battle," chose not to dispatch troops to Yugoslavia.
"Important humanitarian and strategic interests" are at issue there,
he said, but so far it's not been clear that limited force would do the
job.49
Journalists pounced on the West Point speech as the Bush Doctrine.
In the theater of the news media,
[h]is doctrine came down to this: it depends.... "I know that many
people would like to find some formula, some easy formula to
apply, to tell us where and when to intervene with force." That
formula, Bush said, does not exist.... Why Somalia and not Bosnia
.... Because, Bush finally responded, we can easily make a
difference in Somalia and may not-with a lot more effort-be able
to do very much in Bosnia. "The former Yugoslavia-well, it's been
46. The lack of American political partisanship cannot be emphasized enough. I hope that
any suggestion of such thinking in the mind of the reader will be eliminated by the relevancy of
this critique for President Clinton as well, as previously noted.
47. Janis et. al., supra note 23, at 556-58.
48. A goal which, as we will see later, may be an unwise one in a world moving towards
multilateral free trade.
49. American Intervention.. ., WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1993, at A16.
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such a situation." ... Bush felt compelled to offer some sort of
summing up. He mentioned that he had not been loath to use force
where he thought it could matter-Panama, Iraq, Somalia-but that
he always did so when he thought he could do the maximum good
at the least cost. This, it turns out, is the Bush Doctrine ....
Perhaps the Bush Doctrine is better thought of as a corollary to
the new world order doctrine. The problem with this corollary is that
the process of defining the maximum good, and for that matter,
defining a cost or a benefit as well, is inherently tied to a theory or
vision of social behavior. Without a core vision, the cost analysis
varies in its methods and results depending on the situation at hand,
producing an inconsistent corpus of decision making. Because Bush
never resolved this inherent tension, his doctrinal philosophy's
emphasis on the preeminence of sovereignty as a prerequisite to a
peaceful and stable new world order is flawed. Criticisms within
popular international law and critiques from academic international
law illuminate these flaws.
Journalists have noted the "form over substance" nature of the
international dispute requirement in the new world order doctrine.
Although the doctrine assumes that the enemy of peace is internation-
al instability:
[T]he mess in Iraq casts shadows beyond the Mideast and across the
entire "new world order" that Mr. Bush is trying to craft out of the
end of the Cold war as well as the defeat of Iraq. Mr. Bush says he
envisions a world in which a vigilant, American-led world communi-
ty keeps "the dangers of disorder at bay" by ensuring that one
country doesn't interfere with another .... The first priority in that
new world is the stability and sanctity of existing states. That
creates a vexing problem, administration aides acknowledge: What
to do for Kurds and other oppressed groups who don't think they
have got a fair shake? Under the administration's vision, the U.S.
can't do much more than hope that current states can be pressured
into forming more enlightened and democratic governments that
satisfy restive minorities.51
Thus there are at least two fundamental paradoxes of stability in
the sovereign-minded new world order. First, the doctrine uses a
50. Richard Cohen, Summing Up the Bush Doctrine, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1993, at A31.
51. Gerald F. Seib, How Miscalculations Spawned U.S. Policy Toward Postwar Iraq, WALL
ST. J., May 3, 1991, at Al.
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vacuous dichotomy of intranational versus international conflict 2 as
the method for identifying serious dangers of disorder. But in doing
so, highly dangerous internal conflicts that may also determine the
maintenance of peace and the outbreak of war (i.e., stability) are
effaced. Second, a central premise of the new world order is that
peace is a necessary ingredient in cultivating an international respect
for the value of human life and rights. However, stability can exist
between nations while degradations of human rights are occurring
within nations. It would seem, then, that stability alone is not the
hallmark of a new world order, but a particular form of stability is. 3
This insight is lost in the "inter" versus "intra" national focus. The
goal of peace is compromised by the lack of a coherent sociolegal
theory as to which form of stability is desirable in order to create
peace between and within nations.
B. The New World Order Doctrine in Somalia: The Difficulties
Involved in Treating Destroyers as Saviors, Determining Citizen
Consent to Government, and Conceptualizing Civil Society
The Somali experience serves as an awkward precedent for future
humanitarian missions. In fact, one of the first questions raised in
popular international law was whether the mission was purely
humanitarian:
Many observers accept that the U.S. intervention in Somalia was
spurred by George Bush's avowed humanitarian concerns .... Last
week, in a speech critical of the Clinton Administration, Bush
reiterated that view: "The mission was to go in and save lives,"
Bush said. "People were starving, and American troops went in
there and they opened the supply lines and they took food in. They
weren't fighting."'
Yet one may ponder why the United States intervened in Somalia
instead of Liberia, or the Sudan, which are similarly torn by internal
52. Note that this is an outdated dichotomy which has been transcended in new stream
scholarship. See generally Kennedy, supra note 10, and Jackson, supra note 43.
53. William Butler has noted the necessity of delineating between the forms of international
order posed in international law. For instance, in examining Soviet and Russian international
thought, he notes a change from a vision of a tense coexistence of states, engaged in political
struggle, to a vision emphasizing greater cooperation and peaceful competition as opposed to
struggle. Janis et. at., supra note 23, at 563-64.
54. Christopher Whalen, In Somalia, the Saudi Connection: Is America Intervening in the
Horn of Africa in order to Protect Persian Gulf Oil?, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1993, at C02.
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strife. Was the state of affairs in Somalia simply too horrible to
"stomach" compared to other "hot spots" around the globe? An
answer from popular international law places a strategic focus at the
heart of the humanitarian mission:
Specialists in Gulf oil politics, such as veteran journalist Sol Sanders,
also recognize that Iran's limited but growing role in East African
states like Sudan and Somalia is part of a much larger strategy to
gradually encircle the prime target in the region-Saudi Ara-
bia-with a web of regional alliances and covert military opera-
tions.55
In light of these observations, the American mission in Somalia takes
on strategic overtones. A similar perception was widely shared among
Mexican journalists and politicians during the Gulf war:
To many Mexicans, the U.S. motive for going to war isn't so much
creating "a new world order" as defending an old one: First World
interventionism to secure Third World oil. And that touches a raw
nerve in Mexico, which has a lot of oil and a lot of experience with
U.S. intervention. "If a producing country doesn't respond to the
interests of Washington, then the U.S. will do whatever it takes to
guarantee its energy security," wrote a columnist in the business
newspaper El Financiero. "That is the lesson of the Persian Gulf
war for all of the oil-producing countries, among them Mexico."56
To some extent, then, the humanitarian discourse on American
intervention may betray a hidden agenda57 suggesting an alternative
and more strategic focus. Thus, under the new world order doctrine,
humanitarian considerations alone may not be important enough to
trigger American intervention.
Regarding the political negotiations in Somalia, it appears that
America was engaged in a disjointed and contradictory attempt at
nation-building. Robert Oakley, former ambassador and U.S. special
envoy to Somalia, characterized the mission as an overwhelming
success:
55. 1&
56. Matt Moffett, In Mexico, Deep Suspicions of Americans' Motives May Affect Oil Policy,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1991, at A9.
57. See John Conley and William O'Barr, Hearing the Hidden Agenda: The Ethnographic
Investigation of Procedure, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.S 181 (1988).
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President Bush announced early last December the U.S. intention
to protect humanitarian activities and stop mass death in Somalia
with an international military coalition .... The United States
applied what could be likened to a heavy, smothering blanket of
military and political power, drawing upon its military
might-proven in Desert Storm-its aura as a superpower and its
manifest determination to stop the killing .... The goal has been
to gradually empower Somali women's groups and nongovernmental
organizations, clan elders and religious leaders, intellectuals and
others by involving them in community development ... while
stopping forceful intimidation. This double barreled approach has
already achieved enough success that the political conference
meeting in Addis includes as many representatives from these
"new" civil society groups as from the old "factions" . ... A
realistic outcome at this time would be the establishment of regional
administrations, perhaps modeled on the clan/regional political
system that existed before .... The next step could be some sort
of loose national authority.58
This picture presents America as the key world leader actively
engaged in transforming the political landscape of a troubled nation
by empowering civil society groups. This imagery is contradicted,
however, by American support for the United Nations sponsored
meetings of the warring Somali factions. A frustrated American
diplomat negated Oakley's picture of nation-building:
"We Americans can't be coach, quarterback and linebacker all at
the same time. We want to stay with the process, but we want the
U.N. to be fully engaged," said one U.S. diplomat, speaking on
condition of anonymity. "Politics is really their mandate, not
ours."... A top U.N. official, who spoke on condition of anonymi-
ty, defended the invitation of the 14 Somali factions [including
warlords]. "We have no alternative," he said. "They are the power
brokers. It is like dealing with (Serbian President Slobodan)
Milosevic in Yugoslavia." Ethiopian president Meles Zenawi
[stated]: "You stand now before the Somali people, the internation-
al community and history as the principal engineers of the tragedy
in Somalia," Meles told the faction leaders. "You must lead the
way in the resurrection of Somalia, a country that has collapsed in
front of your eyes because of your failure to keep the family quarrel
within acceptable limits."59
58. Robert B. Oakley, Mission Accomplished in Somalia, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1993, at
C07.
59. Jennifer Parmelee, U.N. Hosts Meeting of Somali Factions: World Body Reasserts Role
in Peace Process. WASH. PosT., Jan. 5. 1993. at All.
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This statement presents an overwhelming theme in popular
international law: A disjointed and contradictory mode of analysis.
Despite Oaldey's characterization of America's political mandate to
transform Somalia, the political conference meetings shockingly placed
women's leaders and clan elders side by side with the very warlords
who were responsible for the horrible state of affairs that triggered
American intervention. Although Oakley discusses empowerment,
civil society, and nongovernmental organizational development, the
American appeal to the destroyers to serve as saviors stands in
contradiction to the goal of nation-building. In fact, it would appear
that Steny Hoyer more accurately described the application of the new
world order doctrine when he emphasized dealings with power brokers
that have claims to sovereignty because America is not in the business
of sorting out civil society claims.60 Moalin Abdullah, a Rahanweyn
elder, also emphasized this point: "One of the mistakes," he said
through a translator, "was to contact and approach the warlords who
destroyed this country, instead of contacting and approaching the
suffering people."'"
The very idea of treating the warlords as proper representatives
bespeaks another flaw in the new world order doctrine: The confusion
of states with individuals. Fernando Tes6n has noted this confusion,
contending that such thinking analogizes individuals, as autonomous
beings, with states, as equally autonomous corporate entities exercising
fundamental rights, such as sovereign freedom from intervention. 62
This analogy stands the whole purpose of individual rights on its head.
Rights attach to the individual in order to privilege a sphere of
personal choice. From a public choice perspective, individuals
would hypothetically agree to governmental structures that provide
relatively large realms of private choice. By attaching rights of
sovereignty and nonintervention to the state one actually engages in
a destabilizing process because the "'freedom' of the state ... means,
more often than not, the demise of individual freedoms."' Thus it
would be a fallacy to assume that governments are analogous to
citizens and especially so to assume that a collection of horribly
60. Mossberg, supra note 38.
61. Keith S. Richburg, Somalis Express Familiar Fears Over U.S. Troop Withdrawal: Many
See Civil Upheaval Similar to Fighting That Followed 1991 Pullout-Only Worse, WASH. POST,
Oct. 24, 1993, at A27.
62. Janis et. al., supra note 23, at 562.
63. ld. at 561.
64. Id. at 562.
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dangerous warlords could adequately serve "the interests of the
citizens over whom they rule."65 In the end, "only a State that
respects human rights and the principle of democratic representation
is legitimate and therefore entitled to represent citizens international-
ly."66
The plethora of states that do not respect human rights leads us
to the project of international civil society and its attempt to transcend
and displace sovereignty. Some feminists have seized on this concept
as politically expedient. While Karen Engle has noted the allure of
state sovereignty as protection for those in the margins,67 Karen
Knop observes that "women may feel themselves members of a group
... that extends beyond their State."' 8 Because "women's interests
and concerns ... are shaped by gender, sexuality, culture, and other
factors .... [C]ommon citizenship does not mean that women and
men of the same State think similarly or are affected similarly by
international issues on which their State takes a position., 69 By using
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and networks that define
international civil society, women can arguably influence the evolution
of public international law.7 Knop feels that the growing acceptance
of NGOs at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
and the United Nations is promising, but she contends that NGOs will
never provide an opportunity "for women's voices to be heard
unmediated by States" unless they can "develop an international legal
basis, independent of the consent of States, for NGO participation in
the creation of international law."71 This point is particularly salient
in light of America's equivalence of Somali women's groups and
Somali warlords at the United Nations sponsored meetings.
NGOs' marginal status removes them "from the narrow confines
of self-interest that often dictate the position of States ... ". ."' This
freedom allows NGOs "to be more responsive to women's aspirations
and more creative in developing proposals for change."'73 Nonethe-
65. Id.
66. Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293 (1993) (citing Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory
of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1992)).
67. See Engle, supra note 10.
68. Knop, supra note 66, at 309.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 308.
71. Id. at 311.
72. Id. at 316.
73. Id.
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less, the NGOs that create an international civil society are highly
limited because the "margins are defined by the mainstream fora."74
NGOs must bend and orient themselves to the structure of regional
and international organizations of states as well as to the parameters
of issues drawn by those powerful organizations.75 In that sense, the
concept of an international civil society lacks access to power.
Furthermore, in many respects "international civil society ...
replicate[s] the imbalance of political and economic power that
characterizes the system of States, an imbalance apparent in relations
between First World and Third World NGOs.' 7 6  Due to these
problems, Knop ultimately rejects international civil society as a
feminist project, hoping "that some form of meaningful public debate
is possible under the conditions of the late twentieth century economic
order."77 Despite the lack of resolution of the issue of civil society
in academic international law, clearly these orders of consideration are
relevant to an effective reformulation of popular international law's
contradictory notion of nation building.
C. Valuable Multidisciplinary Insights from the New Stream:
Critiquing the New World Order Doctrine through the
Objectivity of International Relations and Trade as well as the
Subjectivity of Feminism and Cultural Anthropology
International relations theory has generally assumed that a
convergence of economic and legal development would lead to a
homogeneity of political systems.78 The failure of this convergence
to occur bespeaks an international relations critique of the new world
order doctrine. James Feinerman has noted this failure with regard
to China, whose increasing participation in the global economic system
has paralleled its increasing reliance on a doctrine "which essentially
boiled down to the single idea that sovereign nations should respect
each other's independence and not interfere in each other's internal
affairs."79  China refuses to accept or obey rules for international
conduct that do not further Chinese interests" and rejects commen-
tary critical of China's human rights record as unwarranted interfer-
74. Id
75. Id
76. Id at 317.
77. Id at 318.
78. Janis et. al., supra note 23, at 556.
79. Id. at 557.
80. Id at 558.
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ence by outsiders."1 However, China's conduct is contradictory, for
"[i]n the face of the objections of large numbers of its "own people"
(particularly because Chinese claims to sovereignty over Tibet give
Tibetans status as Chinese citizens), these arguments are bankrupt and
untenable."' Moreover, this observation points to another previously
noted contradiction: By supporting the integrity of all states as a
prerequisite to a peaceful world order, the Bush doctrine enhances the
integrity of many nations which are wholly lacking in human rights
standards, and thus is incompatible with American humanitarian
interests.
A further problem with the ascension of sovereignty as the key
to a stable and peaceful new world order is that it is incompatible with
notions of international trade. In international trade thought, liberal
trade's benefits for interdependent nations are taken as a fact.'
Based on this assumption, the public international landscape of
treaties fostering substantive human rights improvements is "replaced
by a network of market relations for which only a few substantive
rules will be necessary."' The picture changes considerably in this
paradigm, "for now the driving image is not a public order of
sovereigns, but a market of economic actors."85  Thus traditional
pragmatist and current new world order distinctions such as the
"international" as opposed to the "national" and the "political" as
opposed to the "legal," are transcended by a deep concern with the
nation as a quagmire filled with tariff and nontariff barriers to free
trade.8 6 The increasing interdependence of the world creates
problems in managing this interdependence.' Such management
requires international economic policy specialists to create interface
mechanisms that will bridge cultural differences and allay political
fears as national markets are increasingly transformed into global
ones.
88
From an international trade standpoint, the goal of organizing
governments into an international public law regime is displaced by
the goal of facilitating the steady flow of goods and services across
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 678.
84. Id
85. Id. at 681.
86. Id. at 682.
87. Id. at 686.
88. 1& at 708.
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national boundaries by eliminating governmental interference. 9 The
key issue in international conflict becomes a question of whether the
policy in question was devised to promote the project of international
trade." From this perspective the international landscape is frag-
mented:
The result.., is a regime divided into two zones: one of interna-
tional economic flows, and another of the underlying terrain of
national politics. The upper zone is sophisticated, rational, and
humane; the lower zone is murky, indulgent, physical, and frighten-
ing.... We are no longer situated nationally, anxious about things
foreign. We are now secure in the cosmopolitan world of interna-
tional economic law, and uneasy only about the shady doings of an
outmoded national politics.9'
How then, are human rights abuses to be resolved in light of the
negative influence of governmental intervention? One policy that has
been suggested is "'benign neglect'.., the possibility that over time
many of these problems will sort themselves out as the necessity of
substantial health and safety regulation becomes apparent to more
nations."92 In a world of growing interdependence, it is presumed
that states will cultivate proper interface mechanisms which will allow
them to harmonize their political standards in order to facilitate the
overarching agenda of liberal trade policy. In this post-sovereign
vision, market actors navigate through a wide variety of institutions
which are independent of a national contextualzation:
a manager of the international trade regime, wherever he or she
works, internationally or nationally, must harness a wide variety of
international, domestic, and foreign entities to get anything done.
... [I]nterdependence brings with it a fragmented sovereign with
many players, which the sophisticated policy manager will under-
stand as numerous opportunities for engagement.93
Thus, the new world order doctrine's emphasis on traditional
sovereignty appears untenable from an international trade standpoint.
Strangely, in other contexts the Bush administration has embraced
89. Id. at 692.
90. Id. at 701.
91. Id. at 693.
92. lId at 705 (quoting Jackson, supra note 43, at 210).
93. Id. at 689.
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liberal trade theory, culminating in the Uruguay Round General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as well as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Therefore the new
world order philosophy of sovereignty appears especially contradictory
given the post-sovereign emphasis in international trade.
However, international trade theory has come under attack from
within new stream scholarship. From an international relations
perspective, Tes6n argues that interdependence, while serving as a
causal factor in the development of international law, should not be
confused with a justification for a specific international law para-
digm. 4 He is particularly concerned with the argument that a
mutuality of moral obligations will devolve from shared economic
dependence. Such a contention leads to the result that those nations
that depend less on others "benefit from a correspondingly lesser
allegiance to international law."'95 Ironically, a high degree of
interdependence may also encourage nations to ignore their obliga-
tions: "We have seen only recently Western democracies respond in
a hesitant, almost servile manner to Iran's unlawful threats and acts
of terrorist violence, presumably because of fear of losing trade
partners or strategic allies., 96 Therefore economic interdependence
offers little hope for harmonious human rights standards because "it
makes legal obligation dependent on the contingent degree of
interdependence."97  Similarly, because the stability of sovereigns
approach ignores potentially highly destabilizing internal conflicts, the
new world order doctrine also "cannot provide an independent basis
of international obligation., 98
Another attack on international trade thinking comes from
feminist insights about international trade's discursive power. Karen
Engle notes that the post-sovereign vision is closely tied to interna-
tional trade's political agenda.9 9 International economic law replaces
substantive human rights standards with benign neglect because public
international regimes may create nontariff trade barriers. This
international trade agenda contrasts sharply with that of feminists:
Women aim to be inside public international law ... because they




98. Id. at 561.
99. Engle, supra note 10, at 109.
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believe it may offer them protection that is unavailable in the family
or even in municipal law. Market actors, on the other hand, want
to be outside international law because they believe they have
greater power with the market's background rules than with
increased regulation.1'0
For these reasons international trade theorists reject the "core" of
government intervention and prefer to operate in the margins of
private transnational commerce. 10' To that end, international trade
theorists accept the benefits of liberal trade as "science-like" facts, and
characterize public international law as an ossified and overly political
and theoretical approach incapable of providing a workable structure
for thinking about international order.' 2
Engle observes that, in contrast to commercial actors, many
women are drawn to the core of law and away from the margins of
business. While market actors see international law as chaos,
interference, fiction, theory, and politics, feminists see the potential for
a better world order that will include protection, facts, practice, and
law."' Many women's rights advocates view modern international
law as the only feasible provider of universal rights and individual
liberties. 4  As economic interdependence foists conditions of
globalization upon the international landscape, these feminists note
that sovereignty is diminished by greater participation in "international
instruments and institutions."' 5 And it as popular international law
assumes, international legal doctrines should be premised on the goal
of creating peace and pervasive respect for human rights, then modern
international law must protect a huge demographic group whose rights
are regularly abused: Women.' 6
In fact, protecting marginalized groups offers a particularly
imaginative and problematic challenge from an anthropological
perspective. The new world order doctrine makes all types of conflicts
equivalent: International conflicts are worthy of American intervention
and internal conflicts generally are not. Both types of conflicts are
subject to the corollary that intervention can still occur if the
maximum "good" can be achieved with a minimum of "cost".
100. Id. at 108.
101. Id. at 115.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 118.
104. Id. at 117.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Nonetheless, these simple equivalencies ignore and efface many
important anthropological considerations. The new world order
doctrine precludes the asking of a key question in formulating human
rights standards: "[T]o what extent do we press our own cultural logics
and moral views on others... ?1 How do we ensure basic health,
housing, and community development standards while recognizing the
vast cultural diversity of legal forms and systems?.. After all,
"[w]hat one culture regards as permissible killing in temporal ways
(trimesters of pregnancy), another defines linguistically (by naming),
and yet another defines spatially and in terms of self-definition."'0 9
Jennifer Schirmer argues convincingly that we must incorporate a
notion of proportionality in formulating human rights standards whose
violation may necessitate American intervention." ° A notion of
proportionality has one essential goal:
[T]o differentiate the nature and conditions of pain and death in
terms of comparative ability to destroy life. This is not so much an
issue of relativity or universality... but one of relative institutional
domination of power in warfare ... or in the daily violence of
grinding poverty. It is meant to redress the ... cultural distortions
of equivalency.'
Through this kind of thinking politicians can begin to cultivate an
approach that will "recognize that special treatment and support need
to be granted to groups that are more vulnerable to others .... "112
In international trade we are beginning to see the emergence of such
practical policy changes as GATT member nations have taken into
account the tenuous economic positions of developing nations in
formulating realignments of tariff and nontariff barriers to free
trade." One begins to see how the argument shifts from protecting
a stable international order from the dangers of disorder to protecting
the powerless from cultural and economic dislocations fostered by the
powerful.
107. Schirmer, supra note 10, at 95.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 97.
110. Id. at 95.
111. Id. at 97.
112. Id. at 95.
113. JOHN H. BARTON & BART S. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND INVESTMENT
158 (1986).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Academic international law has been reformulated by a corpus of
theoretical fields which comprise the new stream. New stream
scholars must turn their attention to the first world's central forum for
discourse: the news media, that is, popular international law's
"washing machine" of international legal statements. Cultural
anthropology is a subjective new stream discipline that is especially
effective at analyzing the discourse of popular international law.
Furthermore, subjective new stream disciplines such as cultural
anthropology need to be brought up to par with the objective side.
Through greater harmony a rich body of multidisciplinary research has
the potential to emerge.
The new world order doctrine dominates popular international
law. This doctrine emphasizes the stability of sovereign nations as the
key prerequisite for peace. Unfortunately, this doctrine has major
flaws, inconsistencies, and disjunctions. By downplaying the impor-
tance of internal conflicts and failing to offer a methodology for
weighing costs and benefits, the simple preservation of sovereignty
cannot preclude aggression. An analysis of the rhetoric surrounding
the Persian Gulf war and the Somali humanitarian mission demon-
strates these disjunctions. Furthermore, the political case for the new
world order doctrine fails to engage academic international law. The
popular international law discussion of this doctrine has much to gain
from new stream perspectives and insights. Ultimately, politicians
must reformulate international legal doctrine in light of objective and
subjective new stream theories.
The political realm will not be transformed into a coherent system
based on the rule of law until politicians commit to core theories of
sociolegal behavior. Otherwise, they will "go the way" of the pragma-
tists, fading into the obscurity of a disjointed doctrine.
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